As we show below, after Operation Lightning Thunder none of the concerned governments considered the LRA to be a genuine threat or a political priority.
Consequently, the only governmental actor for whom the LRA continued to be a significant concern — or was presented as such — was the United States. As a result, a paradoxical situation emerged in which the LRA was not a priority for any of the affected African countries, but remained one for an outside actor.
Throughout our interviews, American governmental actors admitted that there was little enthusiasm for the LRA issue among the directly affected governments. As the interest of the affected countries was limited, they participated in the mission for a number of other reasons, which were not directly related to the threat of the LRA. The lack of a powerful domestic constituency that could affect the crafting of a particular frame, and the lack of framing by the LRA itself, further allowed for a variety of frames to be constructed.
The Congolese government and army consistently denied the LRA threat and argued that it was a minor problem of public security. For example, Congolese army and high-level governmental actors noted on several occasions that the country had more pressing problems, claiming that the core of the LRA threat was eliminated during Lightning Thunder 61 and that the group was reduced to about 20 rebels.
The Congolese position is particularly puzzling because, for some time after Operation Lightning Thunder, the LRA committed major atrocities in Congolese territory, which the government largely ignored in its official position.
As introduced above, the first reason is the peripheral nature of the rebel group in the Congo. The LRA was seen as a movement that was only one among many other armed groups, and as more of a nuisance coming from Uganda than an armed threat. Importantly, the recent history of Uganda—Congo relations played an important role in the Congolese authorities' interpretation of the LRA.
From to , the Ugandan army occupied parts of the DRC. A central feature of their presence was the illegal exploitation of Congolese natural resources, which continued, through proxy groups, even after the Ugandan withdrawal. There were reports of timber being ferried by UPDF elements to Uganda through Sudan, 70 and indications that individual Ugandan soldiers were involved in the ivory trade. In other words, tensions that had developed between Ugandan and Congolese authorities, particularly as a result of the Ugandan occupation of eastern Congo and the low-level threat posed by the LRA to state security, had an important impact on how the Congolese government viewed the conflict.
This in turn led to a distinctive framing of the rebel movement: by minimizing the LRA threat, the Congolese authorities hoped to persuade the Ugandan troops to leave their territory. In other words, the Congolese framing of the LRA conflict occurred as a result of political interests rather than an accurate assessment of the security situation on the ground. This becomes particularly clear when one looks at the dynamic flow of their imaging, because the higher tensions rose between Congolese and Ugandan armed forces, the more Congolese forces minimized the LRA threat.
This was caused predominantly by the continued presence of a large number of Ugandan troops on Congolese territory. Officially, the Ugandan involvement in the DRC ended on 14 March , although there was an informal agreement allowing a limited number of Ugandan forces to stay in the DRC. At the same time, the general LRA threat and large-scale attacks gradually declined. In sum, even during the time of the large-scale LRA attacks, the Congolese authorities chose to ignore most of these attacks.
Instead, the history of Congo—Uganda relations and the interests produced through these relations played an important role in how Congo chose to frame the LRA: by constructing the image of a minimal LRA, it hoped to force the Uganda troops to leave its territory.
In the next section, we build further on these insights, showing how images of the LRA not only changed over time, but also depended on the audience.
The position of the United States played a particularly important role in this process. The Ugandan government presented the LRA not only as a threat to the DRC but also to the international community, albeit in a slightly more nuanced way. Both the Ugandan government and its army generally argued that although the LRA threat to Uganda had declined, the LRA was still a terrorist group posing a regional danger.
As a political force, I would say that, no, it is not a threat, but as a criminal menace in the region, I would also say that it is a threat, especially given that they operate in areas which are hard to reach by governments of DR Congo and Central Africa Republic. However, the government's actions deviated from the above representation. It consistently withdrew troops from its operations against the LRA and redeployed them to other priorities such as the elections, operations in the Karamajong region, and in particular to the African Union Mission in Somalia.
Moreover, to its domestic audience, the Museveni regime emphasized how it had defeated the LRA, bringing peace to northern Uganda, 79 while in its interactions with the international community a more nuanced picture emerged. Addressing European donors, the Ugandan government was not very active in promoting the idea of the LRA as a threat. They have of course more important issues to deal with.
Why they continue dealing with it is related with a lot of issues, but none of which are related with the threat of the LRA. This was not a new process. For many years, the LRA conflict provided the Museveni regime with the means through which it could position itself as America's key ally in the region, and through which it received a number of advantages such as military and diplomatic support. This has been the main lens through which the Ugandan government has regarded the conflict, and its actions can be interpreted in this light.
Moreover, the fact that the US was the main actor interested in the LRA also affected the power dynamics in play. The US needed local actors in the anti-LRA effort, and Uganda had the most disciplined and best-equipped army in the region. This situation gave the Ugandan government a certain leverage, as the US was absolutely dependent on Uganda's participation in the fight against the LRA. Even while not showing a major interest in the issue, and fighting the LRA only on a minimal level, the Ugandan government therefore still played a key role in resolving the issue.
This role proved to be crucial in avoiding substantial donor censure for different governance transgressions, such as its increasingly negative democratic and human rights record, and reported corruption.
American support and interest not only insulated the Ugandan government from donor criticism with regards to its worsening governance record, but also affected the battlefield. At a local level, US support shaped the relations between Ugandan and Congolese militaries.
FARDC considered that it too deserved strong American support, as the conflict was taking place in its territory. We want to be treated equally.
Although this was not communicated officially, this feeling was also frequently voiced among individual FARDC actors on the ground. Finally, the role of the US needs further elaboration. As with Uganda and the DRC, this image of the LRA was not based primarily on the situation on the ground, but rather on other dynamics. On the one hand, Jonathan Fisher 90 convincingly shows how the Museveni regime historically has been successful in shaping the nature and direction of this debate by presenting the LRA as a threat to the US government.
These advocacy organizations came into existence between and , in order to raise awareness on the LRA and the crisis in northern Uganda.
Invisible Children quickly proved particularly influential. This strategy, combined with the lobbying of policy makers, raised their profile and proved to be very successful in bringing broader attention to the LRA, in influencing US policy, and in mobilizing and advocating continued efforts of the US government on the issue.
The Obama administration and to a certain extent the previous Bush administration had their own reasons to be interested in the LRA.
As American governmental actors working on the LRA summarized the situation: the role of the advocacy groups was crucial. They have been raising important awareness in the Congress. The political interest was already there in the administration, but the interest of the Congress made it easier to implement the agenda. And it was particularly the Invisible Children movie which changed things, which raised very much awareness on this issue. As a result, a close alliance emerged between these lobby groups and the US government, both personally 98 and in the implementation of the resulting policies.
For example, in October President Obama announced the the deployment of military advisers to help combat the LRA in Washington, rather than in Uganda.
According to sources in Washington, President Obama did not directly inform President Museveni about this, further illustrating how the message and wider operation was primarily targeted towards an American audience.
The bulk of the US interventions happened after the LRA had ceased its large-scale attacks and had become much weaker. In sum, it is clear that a range of different LRA images existed and that these reflected the interests of the image makers as well as the audiences to which they were speaking. The United States was a particularly important audience, especially for Uganda, and this increased Uganda's leverage.
In the next section, we demonstrate the changeable character of these images, showing how they were not necessarily reproduced at all levels. More specifically, we show how individual Congolese soldiers did not follow the official image of the LRA that was presented by the Congolese authorities.
To some extent, the lower-level commanders and soldiers in the affected areas followed the official FARDC position. In certain instances, citizens warning army units about LRA attacks were arrested for spreading false rumours, as these army units denied any presence of the rebel group.
In other instances, Congolese soldiers prevented the population from fleeing from the LRA. The reasons why are not related to the security situation or tensions with the population, but rather to the political context, and more particularly to how the FARDC as an organization functioned. Salaries were very low and rarely paid, and army units were organized in a largely decentralized manner, which almost forced them to look for survival and profit in situations of conflict.
As certain characteristics of the individuals involved were used to evaluate if an attack was committed by the LRA such as Rasta hairstyle, old clothes, the use of abduction and so on , individual FARDC soldiers could copy these characteristics in order to pin the blame for their activities on the LRA. This strategy was effective given that there was a strong fear of the LRA among the population. As a final example of the internal contradictions within the FARDC, we consider the case of Mbororo cattle keepers, who were present in the area from around and estimated to number between 10, and 20,, controlling large herds of cattle.
The Mbororo conversely accused the military of continuous harassment and a wide range of human rights abuses. In sum, although the Congolese army hierarchy wanted its soldiers to uphold an image in which the LRA was absent, individual Congolese soldiers did not follow this image. Instead, individual soldiers primarily viewed the LRA through their organizational lens, which focused on survival and enrichment.
The image of an active LRA allowed them to account for the loss of ammunition in poaching, to attack the Mbororo and loot cattle, and so on. This article examined how the different actors involved in the struggle against the LRA have framed the LRA differently. The LRA was viewed through particular frames, which determined how the issue was presented. Bilateral political-historical relations played a crucial role in determining how the issue was perceived and framed.
Similarly, the organizational interests of the Congolese army, based on economic enrichment, also played a central role in how the LRA was perceived. The LRA conflict therefore became intrinsically connected with the interests of the various actors involved, which were more important than the actual physical threat posed by the LRA itself.
This represents a fragmented and dynamic situation in which every actor sought to defend its particular interests, and in which particular elements of the LRA conflict were purposefully neglected or emphasized in the construction of a particular image.
The fact that the actual fate of the LRA was unclear, and that the US added to the interests at stake, further encouraged each of the affected governments to manipulate the framing of the LRA in its own interests.
Three other issues are worth mentioning. First, all of the above does not mean that no contestation of these images took place. On a number of occasions, the Congolese population tried to challenge the denial of the LRA by its authorities, for example by forcing individual soldiers to go after the LRA. The Congolese Catholic Church was also outspoken on the issue. However, these contestations had little impact on the Congolese government's acknowledgement of the LRA threat, as other interests were more important.
For example, when parts of the Congolese population established self-defence units in response to the initial LRA threat and the general lack of protection, these units were quickly forbidden by the Congolese governmental authorities, which considered the units a threat to state security. Contestation also occurred within US policy. In Afghanistan, the Taliban has stepped up its use of children for suicide attacks.
In Somalia, the Islamist armed group al-Shabaab has increasingly targeted children for forced recruitment, often abducting children as young as 10 from their homes or schools. In recent years countries have ratified an international treaty pledging not to conscript or use children below age 18 in armed conflict, but 59 countries have yet to join.
In the past five years the UN has negotiated action plans with 17 governments and armed groups in 10 countries to end their use of child soldiers. Since the mids the number of countries where child soldiers have been used has dropped from approximately 30 to The UN Security Council has imposed sanctions against several individuals for recruiting and using child soldiers and established a special working group on children and armed conflict to pressure perpetrators to end their use of child soldiers.
In the United States adopted a law to prohibit some forms of military assistance to governments that recruit or use child soldiers or support militias that do so. The verdict will hopefully send a strong message to child soldier recruiters everywhere that using children in conflict could result in their prosecution and imprisonment.
Another notorious recruiter of children is Charles Taylor, the former president of Liberia, who is awaiting a verdict from the Special Court for Sierra Leone on charges of recruiting child soldiers and other crimes. The Special Court has already convicted eight others for recruiting and using child soldiers. However, individual commanders who recruit and use child soldiers are rarely punished by their home countries.
Kony, a minute video about Kony and the LRA, has received unprecedented interest and attention. To date over million people have clicked on it. The video has also sparked a lot of debate. He and other LRA leaders should be arrested and brought to justice. But the massive interest generated by the video could, and should, be harnessed to transform good intentions into concrete and effective action.
Human Rights Watch will use its in-depth research on LRA atrocities and advocacy outreach to press policymakers in central Africa and around the world to apprehend those wanted by the ICC, protect civilians from further attacks, and assist in the rehabilitation of affected communities. Get updates on human rights issues from around the globe. Join our movement today. Help us continue to fight human rights abuses. Please give now to support our work.
Human Rights Watch. Donate Now. Take Action. Join Us. Give Now. What is the LRA fighting for? How big is the LRA? Does the LRA target children? How many people have been affected by the long war with the LRA? Where is Kony now? Why is it so hard to apprehend Kony and the other LRA leaders?
What can be done to stop LRA abuses? What should governments in the region do? What should the United States do? What should the European Union and its member countries do? What should the UN do? What can the African Union do? What is the role of the International Criminal Court? What is known about Ugandan army abuses? What armies and armed groups besides the LRA use child soldiers?
What is being done globally to end the use of child soldiers? The following steps are critical to ending LRA abuses: Deploy well-trained, capable troops in the numbers needed to protect civilians and arrest LRA leaders.
Better protection of civilians in LRA-affected areas requires deploying sufficient forces, including UN forces, and ensuring that these forces have sufficient transport capacity, including helicopters, to reach threatened civilians quickly.
To apprehend LRA leaders wanted by the ICC—while minimizing risks to civilians held captive by the LRA—the capabilities of troops involved in arrest operations will need bolstering with military special forces or specially trained police units. Ensuring that these UN and other forces respect international human rights and humanitarian law is crucial. Enhance early warning and intelligence gathering. Intelligence gathering should be stepped-up to focus on LRA movements and to identify communities vulnerable to attack.
Coordination, planning, and information-sharing should be improved to allow for timely and appropriate responses to new intelligence. Improve communications, including by building cell phone towers. The LRA has abducted over 67, youth, including 30, children, for use as child soldiers, sex slaves, and porters, and has brutalized communities since its inception in The group draws income from elephant ivory, gold, and diamonds, and has received support from the Government of Sudan since The LRA has contributed to the slaughter of elephants in Garamba National Park in eastern Congo, in order to trade ivory and maintain their activities.
Today, Kony remains at large, with defectors saying that he is mainly in and around the Sudan-controlled disputed enclave of Kafia Kingi.
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