See Sciarra, F. Corr, F. The petitioners claim that this sanctions ruling "demonstrates [a] lack of impartiality, and evinces such a virulent personal bias toward counsel Although the full opinion imposing sanctions upon Attorney Rohn is published, I repeat pertinent portions of my opinion and order in rebuttal of this claim. I approached the distasteful task of weighing Kmart's motion for sanctions with equanimity.
During the sanctions hearing, I stated: "I applaud your representation, your efforts Attorney Rohn to get these words out of your vocabulary. Later, I specifically recognized her continuing efforts:. Saldana, 84 F. Contrary to the petitioners' subjective and selective assertions, my decision in Saldana does not support a claim of personal antagonism or hostility toward Attorney Rohn, Marie Saldana, or any of the other petitioners.
The petitioners contend that I "eschewed the requirements of due process The record does not support this conclusion.
Attorney Rohn was aware of the rule under which the Court might impose sanctions. Kmart invoked Local Rule of Civil Procedure Moreover, the petitioners themselves argue that I was "required to follow the mandate of Local Rule My decision expressly relied on this rule:. Further, in response to a question posed by opposing counsel, Attorney Rohn testified that she knew before the hearing on Kmart's motion for sanctions that she could be suspended or disbarred:.
Yet the petitioners maintain that I made a "gross misstatement of the record" when I declared in Saldana that. See Pet'rs' Reply, Apr. The statements that I am accused of grossly misstating in my opinion appear in the record; only my page references were incorrect.
Attorney Rohn's counsel at the hearing did argue in favor of an admonishment as follows:. See Tr. Attorney Rohn did testify that opposing counsel had "asked that my license to practice law be suspended for six months if not revoked. My Saldana opinion thus did not misrepresent the record, and the petitioners' contention that it did is the quintessence of desperation and over-reaching.
The petitioners also complain that I "improperly considered evidence from other cases and improperly weighed evidence, to sanction Attorney Rohn. They assert that Attorney Rohn and her counsel had no inkling that I might consider her alleged misconduct and use of expletives or gutter language in other District Court cases in determining whether her conduct in the Saldana case warranted sanctions.
My scheduling order did state that the sanctions hearing would "be limited solely to the issue of Attorney Rohn's behavior in this case.
At the beginning of the hearing, however, I clarified this order for Kmart's counsel:. The petitioners omitted this portion of the transcript from their reply pleading. When Attorney Rohn's counsel subsequently claimed to be confused by the scheduling order, I reiterated the scope of the hearing:.
After further discussion, the parties fully and thoroughly examined Attorney Rohn's misconduct in other district court cases as alleged in Kmart's pleadings and countered by Attorney Rohn in her previously-filed opposition.
As I have shown, Attorney Rohn and her counsel knew the scope of the hearing, and were aware of the severity of the potential sanctions.
To the extent my scheduling order may have caused any confusion, I specifically gave Attorney Rohn and her counsel every opportunity to respond to Kmart's allegations through testimony, other evidence, and oral argument. Attorney Rohn and her counsel availed themselves of that opportunity at the hearing, [17] and never sought to file any additional testimony, evidence, or argument.
As previously mentioned, Local Rule I followed this procedure. It was neither necessary nor appropriate to initiate a separate bar association disciplinary proceeding for conduct which occurred in District Court cases, largely on the record. I did not violate Attorney Rohn's due process rights, deliberately or otherwise.
Next, the petitioners assert that media coverage of the Saldana decision "generated grave concern from the public as to counsel's ability to obtain fair rulings," see Pet.
The allegation falls of its own weight. Only one of the scant news articles submitted by the petitioners criticized the Saldana decision. Although the editorialist in question is the son of one of Attorney Rohn's clients, see Pet.
In any event, news media outlets are not an effective barometer for determining whether recusal is warranted, as other courts have acknowledged. Hewlett-Packard Co. Haldeman, F. Accordingly, media coverage of the Saldana decision provides no grounds for disqualification. They state:. My opinion did not describe Attorney Rohn as "vulgar," but referred to her use of profanity as "vulgarity" and referred to her expletives as "gutter language.
These two terms are not expletives. The Saldana sanctions order addressed Attorney Rohn's use of abusive language by directing her to attend a legal civility seminar, to apologize to court officers and personnel, to notify bar ethics committees of these sanctions, and to pay reasonable costs associated with the defendant-respondent's motion for sanctions.
These sanctions fell far short of the suspension or community service suggested by opposing counsel, and were largely remedial in nature. Recall the Supreme Court's statement in Liteky, U. Most recently, Attorney Rohn defended Michael A. Simmonds, Sr. The magistrate judge ordered SJAB to respond to Simmonds' interrogatories, and provide "competent medical authority concerning [its] ability to maintain this case.
Simmonds moved to dismiss SJAB's complaint for lack of prosecution. On April 16, , I granted this motion, and dismissed the complaint against Attorney Rohn's client with prejudice. See South Jersey Adjustment Bureau v. Simmonds, Civ. John Div. My opinion noted that dismissal for failure to prosecute is a "drastic sanction Attorney K.
Glenda Cameron ["Cameron"] signed and submitted the petitioners' motion for recusal on January 21, On April 3, , she signed and submitted the petitioners' reply in support of their motion. During that argument, Attorney Cameron expressed no reservations about my supposed lack of impartiality in matters concerning Attorney Rohn and her clients. Order, Trantham v. Ford Motor Co. I have not issued a single order in either of these cases.
Undaunted by the facts, the petitioners claim that both of these cases provide support for their motion for disqualification. Petitioner Michael Bornn ["Bornn"] has sworn that Judge Moore "imposed sanctions in my case without notice and a hearing" and "has already made rulings in my case. Both of these statements are patently false, and the petitioners have conceded as much by purporting, in a footnote to their reply, to "delete" the statements three months after Bornn swore to them before a notary public.
Further proceedings in that case will determine whether Bornn's false statement was another "scrivener's error. In the other matter in which I have yet to make a ruling, Jones v. He claims to be apprehensive that I will "take out" this "obvious prejudice" on his case.
It should go without saying that a "litigant's fear of an adverse decision" is not compelling evidence of judicial bias. I have explained through references to the record that reasonable, objective, and informed observers would not share Jones' unfounded fears, or doubt my impartiality. Neither my decisions nor the news media's reportage of those decisions evince judicial bias toward Attorney Rohn or her clients. At most, the petitioners have demonstrated that I have sanctioned Attorney Rohn several times for improper conduct, and have made both favorable and unfavorable rulings in her cases.
My decisions do not evince a "deep-seated antagonism that renders fair judgment impossible," and are not grounds for disqualification. Aware that their motion for disqualification relies almost exclusively on judicial decisions, the petitioners declare that "[i]t is obvious, from this evidence alone, that Judge Moore holds some sort of unlawful bias, perhaps gender bias, toward Attorney Lee J.
Rohn and that this extrajudicial bias [23] has impaired his ability to render fair judgment. They claim that "[s]tories evidencing a marked degree of gender bias on the part of Judge Moore abound in the legal community," and assert that "[m]any female attorneys, including counsel, have been threatened by Judge Moore with contempt or sanctions for merely attempting to preserve an objection on the record.
They further claim that "[s]imilar threats to attorneys of color have been reported in the local daily newspapers in some high profile cases. The petitioners further disparage my impartiality by stating that "current and past members of the Attorney General's Office" have told Attorney Rohn that "it was their perception that Judge Moore held a bias against that office.
They do not even document how I supposedly threatened Attorney Rohn with sanctions for attempting to preserve an objection. In addition, the petitioners have not substantiated the loathsome claim that I have threatened attorneys because of their race. See Kampfer v. Gokey, F. Virginia State Bar Ass'n, F. Triad Partnership, Ltd. Hyatt Corp. The respondents characterize my attitude toward the responsibilities of counsel who appear before me as follows:.
One central fact emerges from the petitioners' morass of accusations: The petitioners have absolutely no evidence of personal or extra-judicial bias.
The petitioners' bare accusations are not grounds for recusal, and merely illustrate "the depths to which civil advocacy has fallen. In this Memorandum Opinion, I have examined the petitioners' charges of judicial bias and have chronicled how the recorded facts repeatedly and consistently contradict their accusations.
Armed with the truth, reasonably objective persons would reject the petitioners' overwrought and unfounded contentions, and conclude that I fairly discharge my judicial duties in cases involving the Law Offices of Lee J.
As a district judge, I am sworn to adjudicate all cases which come before me unless proper grounds for disqualification exist. Witco Corp. The duty to preside over cases in the absence of lawful grounds for disqualification is vital in the judicial district of the Virgin Islands, which encompasses somewhat more than , residents, with only two district judges. It would violate my oath of office, and the trust that has been reposed in me, to assign my cases involving Attorney Rohn to another judge.
I will deny the petitioners' motion. Attorney Kevin A. Rames, who represents the Daily News Publishing Co. On the other hand, the St. The magistrate judge denied this motion because, among other reasons, "the contra view to the [p]etition is adequately represented by existing counsel.
Rosenberg, F. All but one of the petitioners' affidavits consist of the same basic five-sentence mantra:. My case is pending before Judge Moore and he imposed sanctions in my case without notice and a hearing or otherwise complying with the requirements of procedural due process.
I believe that Judge Moore is biased against Attorney Rohn. Because of Judge Moore's obvious prejudice against [her], I am fearful he will take it out on my case and me. He has already made rulings in my case which I do not believe are supported by the law and I believe he made those rulings due to his prejudice against my attorney. I review these allegations under section later in this Memorandum Opinion. See infra Sections II. Under section , however, I would assume the truth of these statements and consider whether they would convince a reasonable person that I possess "a special bias or prejudice.
I would find that reasonable persons would not accept such bald, unsupported conclusions as evidence of judicial bias or prejudice. See United States v. Sciarra, F. Globe Int'l, Inc. Balistrieri, F.
Joint Legislative Comm. Review, F. Unit A Schneider, from the case. Government of the Virgin Islands, No. See Order, Civ. Notice, Mar. The Supreme Court has held that "service in accordance with the Hague Convention is mandatory, wherever that Convention applies. Schlunk, U. Before taking such evidence, a practitioner should consult the Hague Convention and all treaty supplements thereto. Even a quick glance at the Hague Convention reveals that the United Kingdom subscribes to this treaty.
See Johnson, F. Plaintiff again moved for partial reconsideration on erroneous and improper findings of facts on a 12 b 1 motion.
Though Judge Moore found that he had converted without notice, a 12 b motion to a judgment on the merits, see Exhibit "26," [ Domino II ] at p. And although acknowledging the Domino Plaintiff's claim and affidavit of incomplete discovery which could have been accepted as a Rule 56 f motion , Judge Moore nonetheless dismissed the claim finding that "Plaintiff had ample opportunity to defend against the motion, or to advise the Court of its inability to do so without more time through a Rule 56 f motion.
Rohn for her repeated use of the word "fuck" during judicial proceedings and her other uncivil conduct toward fellow attorneys and expert witnesses is GRANTED. Attorney Rohn shall attend in person and satisfactorily complete a seminar on civility in the legal profession within twelve months after the entry of this Order.
This seminar must be sponsored or offered by a law school accredited by the American Bar Association or a reputable provider of continuing legal education. Once completed, Attorney Rohn shall file an affidavit with the Court so attesting.
It is further. ORDERED that Attorney Rohn shall send letters of apology to all the lawyers she demeaned and insulted by her vulgarity and abusive conduct in the District Court cases referred to in the attached Memorandum.
Attorney Rohn also shall apologize in writing to the deposition and trial witnesses as well as the court reporters present at these judicial proceedings.
Attorney Rohn shall at the same time file copies of these letters with the Court. ORDERED that Kmart file an affidavit of attorney's fees and costs associated with bringing its motion for sanctions within twenty days after the date of this Order. Attorney Rohn shall file any response within ten days thereafter.
The Court thereafter will enter an order requiring Attorney Rohn to reimburse Kmart for its reasonable fees and costs in pursuing the motion. During the course of the telephone deposition of a witness, the following exchange took place between Rohn, Attorney Beth Moss, a Virgin Islands attorney, and Attorney Todd Newman, another Virgin Islands attorney who participated by telephone:.
Rohn: While we're waiting, let's identify who we represent. I'm Lee Rohn, I represent the Plaintiff. In a deposition conducted a few months later, the following dialogue took place between Attorney Rohn and Attorney Neal L. Q Schonhaut : Is it fair to say that during the 23 years of doing undercover surveillance you have continuously made efforts to conceal your efforts at a subject's. Rohn: I will put my remarks on the record as I'm entitled.
I don't need to be lectured by you, sir. Don't fuck with me. Rohn: You are not the judge in this case. I don't think you make that determination, although you always act like you do. I will make all the objections that I want. During a telephone conversation, Rohn screamed at Attorney Beth Moss to "just get me the fucking phone numbers" for an upcoming deposition.
During a conversation with Attorney Andrew Simpson arising in this case, Rohn told Simpson "you know Andy, go fuck yourself. After a jury verdict returned in favor of her client, Attorney Rohn sent a letter to a defense expert witness stating the following:. Since you threw down the gauntlet, I thought you would be interested in knowing what the jury decided. The jury awarded Ms. They discounted your testimony completely and felt you were pompous and arrogant.
I did concur with one of the jurors who referred to you as a Nazi. A For misconduct defined in these Rules and for good cause shown, and after notice and opportunity to be heard, any attorney admitted to practice before this court may be disbarred, suspended from practice before this court, reprimanded or subject to such other disciplinary action as the circumstances may warrant. B An act or omission by an attorney admitted to practice before this court, individually or in concert with any other person or persons, which violates the applicable Rules of Professional Conduct referred to in Rule a 1 shall constitute misconduct and be grounds for discipline whether or not the act or omission occurred in the course of an attorney-client relationship.
See Letter from Attorney Kevin A. Rames to the Honorable Thomas K. Moore and All Counsel of Record Feb. The petitioners have not responded to this allegation. Abramson, Crim. John App. Oct 5, acknowledging that counsel addressed the Bankruptcy Basics Seminar at the District Court on April 16, , about "the importance of complying with the [Federal] Rules [of Bankruptcy Procedure] and the consequences of failing to do so," and also paid a monetary sanction for violation of those rules.
Croix Marine, Inc. Thompson, F. Communications Co. American Tel. Danyo, F. Valenti, F. See Grinnell Corp. Sprauve ["Sprauve"] for lying under oath, among other things, in obstructing District Court litigation, he leveled the charge that his disbarment resulted from racial bias. My opinion in the Mastromonico case carefully documented Sprauve's legal misconduct, dispelling any suggestion that his disbarment resulted from anything other than his own misdeeds.
Mastromonico, 86 F. After Mr. Sprauve declined to comply with the procedural requirements for an appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed his efforts to challenge my decision.
July 16, ; Order, No. The Court of Appeals also has disbarred Mr. Rohn," Pet. Although they advance the declaration of Assistant Federal Public Defender Pamela Lynn Wood ["Wood"] as support for their allegations of chauvinism, Attorney Wood's affidavit does not adopt those allegations, and Attorney Wood has never asked me to disqualify myself for personal or gender bias in any of the myriad cases in which she has appeared before me.
District Court, Virgin Islands, D. July 24, Gary M. Alizzeo, St. Introduction Attorney Lee J. As the Supreme Court has declared: [O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.
Thus, judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge Not establishing bias or partiality A judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administrationeven a stern and short-tempered judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administrationremain immune.
Underlying Law The petitioners move for disqualification under title 28, sections and of the United States Code. Judicial Grounds Advanced for Disqualification I categorically reject the petitioners' allegations that I am "blinded by personal bias" "so total, reckless and malicious" that I "appear bent on punishing counsel," and refuse to fairly apply the law, "seemingly to publicly humiliate Attorney Rohn," who has "suffered Daniel v.
Henry v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp. Codrington v. Anderson v. Anderson filed. The Court noted that the initial efforts to determine the ownership of [Attorney Rohn's] red Jeep and [a suspect's] connection to it were properly based upon reasonable suspicion arising from information received in an ongoing criminal investigation of drug activity.
By late February , however, what may have started as a proper investigation was converted and perverted into an effort to "dig up dirt" on Rohn and her client in response to [this civil] lawsuit. First, plaintiff's counsel issued the Croix and directed it to an entity located far outside the geographic reach of this Court's civil jurisdiction. The subpoena also commanded the recipient to produce documents to plaintiff's counsel's office located in St.
This Court cannot order a non-party outside of its jurisdiction to produce documents to a place within this district The subpoena also failed to include the text of subdivisions c and d of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 45 as mandated by the rule. Aside from the correct heading, As my telephone conference with the attorneys on the preceding evening was not recorded, I made the following statement before the emergency hearing began: [A]lthough there should have been no confusion because it was always made clear that this hearing would be handled on St.
Thomas as my schedule allowed And so the subpoenas were for St. That's why Attorney Rohn made arrangements to get people here. One of the things that I have said, as police officers testify, and you can get back to St. Figueroa v. I accordingly dismissed petitioner Figueroa's entire complaint, including the federal Title VII claim and the local VICRA claim, as well as other strictly local causes of action: As the remaining counts state no federal cause of action, this case will be dismissed with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Defendants have moved for costs and such will be awarded under 5 V. This Court finds that at least the Title VII claim was frivolous and filed in bad faith, and this Court invites defendants to move for sanctions under 28 U. Griffith v. She stated: Should Royal refuse to obey the Court's order, then I will move the Court to hold them in contempt, which would range from a fine, to a requirement that Mr. Gentry travel to the U. Virgin Islands to be deposed. Gentry has to hide. I would suggest that his appearance for a brief, factual deposition of an hours length, as scheduled, rather than his later being forced to come to the Virgin Islands, as a result of a contempt of Court's order against Royal Puerto Rico would be preferable.
Rohn to "Jonas Day" Apr. Gentry's solicitors responded to this letter by reminding Attorney Rohn that their client still had not received proper service of process: [Gentry] will, of course, comply with any valid order issued by a court having jurisdiction over him. Should you wish to obtain evidence from our client, we suggest that you comply with the appropriate procedures that are set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and in 28 U. Gentry's deposition did not take place on April 9, Jones Day responded to the letter on April 14, referring to the "threats contained in [plaintiff's counsel's] letter [as] both unfounded and offensive" a description this Court finds charitable.
The letter also referred to a form subpoena served on Mr. Gentry which had been filled in by plaintiff's counsel captioned under the header "United States District Court Knightsbridge District of London" dated March Jones Day pointed out that "[n]o such court exists," a point this Court, which does exist, can take judicial notice of.
As a sanction for this unprofessional conduct, the Court is inclined to bar plaintiff from attempting to depose Mr. In fairness to the plaintiff, however, the Court must allow the facts to surface. It can quite fairly be said that Mr. Gentry's acts blurred the line between Royal PR and Royal International to the extent that, for these purposes, the latter can be considered an alter ego of the other. Therefore, in the interest of fairness and judicial economy, plaintiff's counsel can depose Mr.
Gentry pursuant to, and only pursuant to, the Hague Convention. If plaintiff's counsel chooses to depose Mr. Gentry, it will be at her expense and at a convenient time and place for Mr.
Finally, defense counsel and counsel for Mr. Gentry should provide a copy of its expenses in dealing with this matter to both the Court and plaintiff, who shall bear such costs. In this first, unpublished decision, I noted that [m]uch fact intensive squabbling has [occurred].
Phoenix has denied [Domino's] claim in full based on the alleged fraud in submitting the re-processing claim. Domino has filed suit alleging breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and requests punitive damages. Phoenix filed a motion to dismiss the bad faith claim, to which Domino responded and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.
However, while the complaint survives the motion to dismiss generally, the punitive damages claim does not. Because of the submissions to the Court outside of the pleadings the Court can properly consider the motion to dismiss a motion for summary judgment and will do so for the limited purpose of the punitive damages claim.
I rejected these arguments in a third previously unpublished opinion, reproduced in part below: Domino's primary claim to error is its inability to obtain sufficient discovery on its bad-faith claim due to the entry of a protective order more than a year before Phoenix filed its motion to dismiss.
Domino had Phoenix's responses to its twenty six interrogatories, ten of which applied specifically to the allegations of fraud. Additionally, Phoenix deposed Dru McCarthy, Phoenix's 30 b 6 witness, and Michael Donnelly, the claims adjuster before the protective order was entered. One of the grounds for Domino's Motion for Additional Extension of Time to Respond to the motion to dismiss,[footnote 2] was a request for more time to digest the 30 b 6 deposition as "it is extremely long, with exhibits comprising approximately seven hundred fifty pages.
Saldana v. To her further credit, no one has submitted any subsequent instances of Attorney Rohn's use of profanity during depositions or communications with other counsel during the all too extended length of time the Court has had this motion under consideration. To some extent, then, the delay in the Court's decision has been to Attorney Rohn's benefit as the sanction that would have been imposed at the time of the hearing would have been more severe and has been tempered in light of Attorney Rohn's apparent success at cleaning up her vocabulary.
The task is also distasteful because Rohn is otherwise a very talented and successful trial attorney who has no need to engage in such behavior. See LRCi If Attorney Rohn fails to follow these Rules, she is subject to disbarment, suspension from practice before this Court, reprimand, or subject to such other disciplinary action as the circumstances may warrant. Further, in response to a question posed by opposing counsel, Attorney Rohn testified that she knew before the hearing on Kmart's motion for sanctions that she could be suspended or disbarred: Q: Attorney Rohn, in your letter A: Yes.
You were trying to take my license to practice law away. Yet the petitioners maintain that I made a "gross misstatement of the record" when I declared in Saldana that Rohn clearly was aware of the possible range of sanctions that the Court could impose. Her counsel argued in favor of an admonishment, while Attorney Rohn herself acknowledged the possibility of suspension or disbarment. Hearing Tr.
To the extent this Court might wish to admonish this type of behavior that is one thing, but I believe given the record here, the very skimpy record, I believe anything else wouldn't be appropriate. My earlier remarksI'm notI don't mean to limit the scope of the hearing.
We're talking about what attorney Rohn has done in the district court. What I'm talking about, I'm not interested in hearing what other attorneys do. I thought that Your Honor washad restricted this to district court matters.
Am I to understand that these other alleged acts in other district court matters are going to form a part of this hearing? Because if so I would like to render my strongest objection. I understand that we were limiting the inquiry to what had occurred within the four corners of this case, not what may or may not have happened [in other district court cases].
That's not my ruling. What I had intended to convey, and obviously I didn't do it very well at the outset, is that I'm not interested in what other attorneys mayhow they may conduct themselves. But it seem to me from what I read, and the motion and the opposition, and the reply, if there's anything to this it would amount to a pattern of conduct on attorney Rohn's part. But number two, I would then ask for the opportunity then to present evidence to Your Honor concerning the circumstances and background of all of these other so called district court matters.
For example, you know Williams v. Rene, attorney Rohn herself was never admonished. There was never conduct that Ms.
Please help us improve our site! No thank you. LII U. Code Notes State Regulations prev next. Where the ground for disqualification arises only under subsection a , waiver may be accepted provided it is preceded by a full disclosure on the record of the basis for disqualification. June 25, , ch. Historical and Revision Notes Based on title 28, U.
Changes were made in phraseology. Editorial Notes. Amendments —Subsec. Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries.
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